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 Abstract  
We find evidence that the leadership of overconfident CEOs induces 
stakeholders (i.e. suppliers) to take actions that contribute to the leader’s 
vision. By being intentionally over-exposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their 
firms, overconfident CEOs exhibit a strong belief in their firms’ prospects. 
This belief attracts suppliers and induces more commitment including 
greater relationship-specific investment and higher relationship durability. 
Our evidence suggests that overconfident CEOs achieve these stakeholder 
commitments through their leadership actions rather than their verbal 
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“I told people you weren’t betting on a device. You were betting on Steve Jobs.”  
~ Randall Stephenson (AT&T CEO) 
 
Managerial overconfidence can significantly affect corporate activities and outcomes. 
Studies show that overconfident CEOs destroy firm value by over–investing, making 
costly merger and acquisition decisions, and employing loose accounting practices.1 Yet, 
some of the most successful leaders, such as Jack Welch of General Electric and Steve 
Jobs of Apple Inc., displayed managerial overconfidence during their tenure as CEO. 
Recent studies have uncovered important benefits to employing overconfident CEOs such 
as higher R&D productivity and innovation output (Galasso and Simcoe, 2011, Hirshleifer, 
Low, and Teoh, 2012). We add to this growing literature by asking: Are overconfident 
CEOs better leaders? 
Our definition of leadership follows Hermalin (1998), where a leader’s actions motivate 
key stakeholders, such as suppliers, to exert greater effort. Leadership is distinct from 
formal authority because stakeholders’ actions are voluntary. In this context, suppliers 
choose to invest in relationship-specific assets and to sell their products to customers. To 
motivate stakeholder actions, a leader must have strong self–belief and belief in the firm’s 
prospects under her leadership. Recent psychology studies show that overconfident people 
are more respected and influential, and that their peers view overconfidence as a proxy 
for competence (e.g., Anderson, Brion, Moore, and Kennedy, 2012; Kennedy, Anderson, 
and Moore, 2013). These psychological underpinnings motivate our hypothesis that the 
leadership of overconfident CEOs may attract greater stakeholder commitments. 
Short of conducting interviews or running experiments, leadership and influence are 
typically unobservable and difficult to quantify and measure. Instead, we test our 
leadership hypothesis by focusing on the observable actions of one important class of firm 
stakeholders – suppliers. This is an ideal test setting because their voluntary cooperation 
                                                            
1 For example, see Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Billet and Qian (2008), Kolasinski and Li (2013), 
Schrand and Zechman (2012), Ahmed and Duellman (2013), Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner, Nanda, and Tham 
(2015). 
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represents a significant leadership outcome, particularly when stakeholder effort and 
commitment are critical to a firm’s success. From the stakeholder’s view, such 
commitment and effort require costly investments that have low value outside of the 
relationship. A classic example are the steel dies used to form the body of a car model, 
which have low outside practical value (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978). Therefore, 
stakeholders will only commit effort and develop specialized investment if they strongly 
believe in the leadership of the firm’s CEO. 
The success of the original iPhone is a recent example of the importance of stakeholder 
commitment. AT&T (then Cingular) helped Apple Inc. to secretly develop the iPhone 
and made heavy concessions to become the exclusive iPhone carrier in the U.S. market, 
effectively tying their fate to the iPhone’s future prospects.2 This example shows the close 
interdependency between a firm’s success and the commitments made by a firm’s 
stakeholders towards product design and quality. More notably, the decision of Randall 
Stephenson, the CEO of AT&T, to commit relationship-specific investment to Apple Inc. 
was not motivated by the prospect of the iPhone per se, but by his belief in the leadership 
of Steve Jobs, then the CEO of Apple Inc. This is the essence of Randall Stephenson’s 
statement: “I told people you weren’t betting on a device. You were betting on Steve Jobs.” 
Following extant literature, we measure CEO overconfidence using vested in-the-
money stock options of CEOs in the ExecuComp database.3 While holding vested in-the-
money stock options may under-diversify the CEO’s wealth (Hall and Murphy, 2002), it 
may also provide the benefit of significant leadership for at least three reasons. First, 
having “skin in the game” conveys the CEO’s strong belief in the firm’s prospects because 
the CEO’s human capital is already tied to the firm. Second, it demonstrates a willingness 
to lead by example. Hermalin (1998) argues that leading by example may be a credible 
form of leadership and cites historical examples including Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
marching at the head of civil rights marches. Third, holding vested-in-the-money options 
reflects a commitment to exert costly effort (Gervais, Heaton, and Odean, 2011). 
                                                            
2 “Life After the iPhone: How AT&T’s Bet on Apple Mobilized the Company” Forbes Jan 21, 2013. 
3 For example, see: Campbell et al. (2011), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh 
(2012), Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner, and Nanda (2015). 
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Our evidence suggests that overconfident CEOs raise the likelihood of initiating a new 
dependent supplier network as well as expanding the existing dependent supplier network.4 
For example, the findings indicate that overconfident CEOs increase the probability of 
adding a dependent supplier by +1.2%. This is economically large given that only 7.2% 
of firm-year observations in our sample experience an increase in dependent suppliers. 
These findings are consistent with the view that overconfident CEOs are able to influence 
important suppliers to commit to their leadership vision. 
A concern with this interpretation is the possibility of an omitted variable 
simultaneously inspiring the CEO to hold vested-in-the-money options and inducing 
growth in the firm’s supplier network. We address this issue by estimating conditional 
logit regressions that include firm strata (i.e. fixed effects) to capture unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and industry-year strata to capture industry growth cycles. In these tests, 
we exploit the timing of the vested-in-the-money option to examine whether stakeholders 
are influenced by the CEO’s actions. While overconfidence is considered a permanent 
trait, its revelation can represent leadership action. We also employ an overconfidence 
measure that requires active managerial choice rather than inaction or inertia (Kolasinski 
and Li, 2013). This measure also addresses the possibility that overconfidence reflects 
insider information. This approach yields similar results, suggesting that industry growth 
cycles, unobserved firm heterogeneity, and insider information are unlikely driving our 
findings. 
To sharpen our analysis, we focus on firms where stakeholder commitment is 
particularly valuable. For instance, specialized inputs, such as the components of an 
iPhone, require customized supplier investment compared to commoditized inputs for 
commercial retailers. Suppliers of relationship-specific inputs may be reluctant to develop 
customized products due to costly initial investment and low ex-post re-deployability of 
the inputs if the relationship terminates (Titman, 1984). Relationship-specific investment 
creates value because it improves productivity (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000), enhances core 
                                                            
4 We follow SFAS 14 in classifying dependent suppliers as firms that generate at least 10 percent of revenues 
from a customer firm. Sample firms that are not reported as customers in this dataset are assumed to have 
no dependent suppliers. Section 3.2 provides details on our customer-supplier dataset. 
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competency (Parmigiani, 2007), and stimulates inter-project spillovers (Kang et. al., 
2009). We hypothesize that the leadership of overconfident CEOs is particularly important 
in this scenario because suppliers will only commit relationship-specific investment if they 
have strong conviction in the leadership of their customer firm’s CEO. 
We test this prediction by examining durable manufacturing firms because this sector 
produces unique products that require greater relationship-specific inputs from suppliers 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988; Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim, 2008). Consistent with this 
hypothesis, our results are pronounced in the durable manufacturing sector. The results 
are also stronger for firms in high ‘contract intensity’ industries where ‘contract intensity’ 
represents the depth of relationship-specific investment between supplier and customer 
industries (Nunn, 2007).5 These results support the view that CEO overconfidence is 
particularly important in influencing supplier commitment when greater relationship-
specific investment is necessary. 
We also find direct evidence of relationship-specific investment in two additional tests. 
We use the supplier’s R&D intensity as a proxy for the general production of asset-specific 
outputs following Kale and Shahrur (2007) and Raman and Shahrur (2008). The evidence 
suggests that the presence of an overconfident CEO raises suppliers’ R&D intensity. The 
effects are stronger for smaller suppliers who typically have less bargaining power over 
their customer. This evidence is consistent with the view that overconfident CEOs are 
able to provide better leadership to smaller suppliers who typically require more 
assurances. Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) propose that the depth of supply chain 
commitment should be borne out in the duration of a customer-supplier relationship. We 
implement an Andersen-Gill extension of the Cox proportional-hazard model to analyze 
the durability of customer-supplier relationships. We find that supplier relationships with 
customer firms face lower termination risk when the customer CEO is overconfident. 
Together, this set of findings suggests that overconfident CEOs influence the actions of 
their key suppliers. 
                                                            
5 Contract intensity is measured as the proportion of inputs in an industry that are neither bought nor sold 
on an exchange nor reference-priced (Nunn, 2007). 
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While our set of findings provide support for the leadership hypothesis, our evidence 
is potentially consistent with a ‘dark-side’ view of overconfidence – CEOs may overpay to 
acquire these commitments. In this scenario, the leadership outcomes we document may 
lower profitability and destroy firm value. However, additional tests reveal no support for 
this view. Instead, the evidence suggests that firms led by overconfident CEOs have higher 
future gross profitability, lower input costs, and generate higher risk-adjusted returns 
relative to their competitors. This is consistent with a bright-side view that overconfident 
CEOs enhance firm value. 
A natural question is whether the manner through which leadership is expressed is 
important in our setting. As previously argued, options holdings (i.e. “skin in the game”) 
conveys a strong personal belief of the CEO in her own leadership abilities. Alternatively, 
CEO overconfidence can be measured from communications during media appearances, 
which may also potentially influence stakeholders. Using a media-based measure of CEO 
overconfidence (Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner, and Nanda, 2015), we find that suppliers 
tend to respond to the CEO’s actions rather than their verbal statements.6 These findings 
suggest that, in our setting, suppliers are not necessarily swayed by cheap talk. Rather, 
they require the CEO to lead by example (i.e. actions) before making their costly 
commitments. 
An alternative interpretation of our findings is that stakeholder commitments result 
from the tendency of overconfident CEOs to over-invest, engage in M&A activities, and 
pursue innovation projects (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Galasso and Simcoe, 
2011; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012). These types of corporate activities may 
mechanically attract new suppliers. However, it is not clear that simply increasing 
corporate activities is sufficient to induce costly relationship-specific investment (RSI) 
unless the supplier is convinced that the leadership of the CEO will deliver long-term 
                                                            
6 If the interests of both parties are perfectly aligned, verbal communication (cheap talk) are sufficient to 
induce commitments from stakeholders since stakeholders deduce that the CEO has no incentives to lie (see 
Farrell and Rabin, 1996). On the other hand, stakeholders will not believe in the CEO’s words if both 
parties face diametrically opposite interests and the CEO has no incentive to speak the truth. Between the 
extremes, cheap talk may convey various amounts of information. In our context, stakeholders may discount 
words over actions due to imperfectly-aligned interests since relationship-specific investments are costly and 
concerns over asymmetric bargaining power and holdup remain. 
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value. Notably, our results are most pronounced for RSI-intensive firms/industries and 
robust after controlling for M&A activities. In a similar vein, while the results are 
consistent with an innovation channel, innovation is inherently risky. Stakeholders must 
be convinced to take these risks and follow the CEO’s vision. 
Lastly, we address the selective disclosure issue of the customer-supplier dataset. In 
June 1997, SFAS 131 was issued which requires firms to disclose sales to each material 
customer, but not the identity of the customer. Even prior to its issuance, Ellis, Fee, and 
Thomas (2012) find selective disclosure of customer identities by firms. To the extent that 
suppliers that commit greater RSIs for their customers are more likely to disclose the 
identities of their customers and also take stronger cues from the overconfidence of their 
customer firms’ CEOs, this would favor us towards finding our results. However, Ellis, 
Fee, and Thomas (2012) find the opposite selective disclosure inclination – suppliers with 
greater proprietary costs are less inclined to disclose their customers’ identities due to 
product market competition. This finding works against our results. 
1 Literature Review and Contribution 
Recent studies explore the economics of leadership and how leadership can affect firm 
outcomes. Hermalin (1998) and Komai, Stegeman, and Hermalin (2007) show that by 
setting an example, managers may signal private information, motivating subordinates to 
work harder. Almazan, Chen, and Titman (2013) show that “top-down” capital allocation 
may optimally create higher levels of investment expenditure to motivate effort from 
employees. 
Our key contribution is to provide empirical evidence supporting theories on 
leadership by examining stakeholder actions. Our evidence suggests that stakeholders are 
more committed when the firm’s CEO is overconfident. The finding on supplier 
commitment emphasizes that CEO leadership reaches beyond the boundaries of the firm 
to include outside stakeholders, particularly for firms in industries that are reliant on 
relationship-specific investment. 
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Our findings are also consistent with the view that overconfidence is a useful 
leadership trait. In experimental settings, studies show that overconfident people are more 
respected and influential, and are viewed as more competent (Anderson, Brion, Moore, 
and Kennedy, 2012; Kennedy, Anderson, and Moore, 2013). Our empirical setting finds 
support for this idea. In addition, we compare the display of overconfidence using “skin in 
the game” actions (i.e., the CEO’s willingness to hold vested in-the-money options) and 
conversations with the media. The evidence indicates that suppliers are more likely to 
respond to “skin in the game” actions rather than positive words in media appearances. 
A large literature shows that overconfident CEOs have a significant impact on firm 
outcomes. An open question is why boards appoint overconfident CEOs (Goel and Thakor, 
2008; Gervais, Heaton, and Odean, 2011) when evidence suggests that CEO 
overconfidence causes over–investing, costly mergers and acquisitions, and loose 
accounting practices.7 However, recent studies find a ‘bright side’ of CEO overconfidence. 
Overconfident CEOs generate higher R&D productivity and innovative output (Galasso 
and Simcoe, 2011; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012). Our evidence is also consistent with 
a ‘bright side’ of CEO overconfidence in that the leadership of overconfident CEOs induce 
valuable relationship-specific investment from key stakeholders and improve firm value.8 
Our finding also contributes to a broad literature on the determinants of customer-supplier 
relationship by showing that leadership actions affect the supply chain. 
2 Sample Selection and Data 
We start with firms in the Execucomp database with available CEO stock option data. 
Following the standard literature, we remove utilities (SIC: 4000 – 4999) and financial 
firms (SIC: 6000 – 6999). Next, we identify customer and supplier pairs from the business 
                                                            
7 See: Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Billet and Qian (2008); Kolasinski and Li (2013), Schrand and 
Zechman (2012), Ahmed and Duellman (2013), Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner, Nanda, and Tham (2015). 
8 Relationship-specific investment (RSI) improves productivity (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000), enhances core 
competency (Parmigiani, 2007), and stimulates inter-project spillovers (Kang et. al., 2009). Dyer and 
Nobeoka (2000) find that Toyota’s ability to effectively create and manage network-level knowledge-sharing 
processes with her suppliers explains partially the relative productivity advantages enjoyed by Toyota and 
her suppliers. Kang et al. (2009) indicates that RSI can create extra economic value through inter-project 
spillovers with the same contracting partner and finds empirical support using Taiwanese suppliers of 
original equipment manufacturers. 
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segment files of Compustat.9 Principal customer names are manually matched to 
Compustat GVKEYs following the approach in Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006).10 
Inverting this dataset provides a list of firms that report the identities of their dependent 
suppliers. 
We identify whether our sample of Execucomp firms is reported as customers by firms 
in the customer-supplier dataset. Increase (Decrease) in Number of Suppliers is an 
indicator equal to 1 if the year-on-year change in Number of Suppliers is positive 
(negative), and 0 otherwise. Start of Supplier Network equals to 1 if a firm has at least 
one dependent supplier in year t and none in year t-1, and equals to 0 otherwise. End of 
Supplier Network is defined symmetrically. When Start of Supplier Network and End of 
Supplier Network both equate to 0, then we keep the previous value of the measure. 
Number of Suppliers is the number of dependent suppliers in the firm’s network. 
Financial variables and stock return data are obtained from Compustat and CRSP. 
We collect insider trades from Thomson Insider, and acquisition data from SDC Platinum. 
Our sample period starts from 1993 and ends in 2011, which is the last year that we have 
information on customer-supplier pairs. Using these databases, we construct the following 
variables: firm size, leverage, return on assets (ROA), ROA Volatility, sales growth, 
market-to-book ratio, capital expenditure, R&D, cash, past stock return, CEO tenure, and 
acquisitions. The Appendix provides full variable construction details. We have 1,921 
unique firms from 1993 to 2011, totaling a panel of 14,745 firm-year observations. 
2.1 Measures of CEO Overconfidence 
Our primary measure of CEO overconfidence is a stock option-based measure, which is 
motivated from Malmendier and Tate (2005). Since our data on CEO stock options is 
                                                            
9 In accordance with SFAS 14, public firms are required to disclose sales to their principal customers, defined 
as customers that contribute to at least 10 percent of the total revenue of the firm or if sales to a customer 
are material to the business of the firm. 
10 For customer names that are abbreviated, we hand-match and use industry affiliations to determine 
whether the customer is in Compustat. For the remaining unmatched customers, we check their corporate 
websites in the Directory of Corporate Affiliation (DCA) database to determine if the customer is a 
subsidiary of a listed firm. If so, we assign the customer to its parent’s GVKEY. To ensure accuracy, we 
discard any customer name that cannot be unambiguously matched to a GVKEY. 
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from Execucomp, we compute the average moneyness of the CEO’s option holdings 
annually following the approach in Campbell et al. (2011), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 
(2011), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012), and Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner, and Nanda 
(2015). From Execucomp, we obtain the number and value of the CEO’s vested stock 
options to construct CEO Overconfidence as the ratio of average value per option to 
average strike price, where the average value per option is the total value of the CEO’s 
option holdings (Execucomp: opt unex exer val) scaled by the number of such options 
(Execucomp: opt unex exer num). The average strike price is the firm’s stock price at the 
end of the fiscal year (CRSP: prcc f) less the average value per option. We define Holder 
67 as an indicator that equal to 1 if the CEO Overconfidence measure is at least 67% in-
the-money on at least two occasions in the past five years (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 
2005; Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner, and Nanda, 2015). 
We create two indicator variables to capture when overconfidence is revealed. CEO 
Overconfidence Up is an indicator equal to 1 when CEO Overconfidence is in the top 
quartile in year t but not so in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. CEO Overconfidence Down is 
an indicator equal to 1 when CEO Overconfidence is in the top quartile in year t-1, but 
not at year t. These variables capture the timing of overconfident CEO actions so we can 
precisely link this to stakeholder actions. 
Since unexercised options represents a non-action, it may reflect inattention or inertia 
rather than overconfidence. We estimate Kolasinski and Li (2013)’s measure of 
overconfidence that sidesteps this issue. This measure tracks the CEO’s unprofitable 
insider purchases of firm stock which captures trading action rather than inaction or 
inattention. Overconfidence Trade is an indicator equal to 1 if the CEO purchases shares 
over the next 2 years that experience negative buy-and-hold returns benchmarked against 
the Fama-French size-decile portfolio. To capture the timing of when overconfidence is 
revealed, we construct an indicator variable, Overconfidence Trade Up, equal to 1 if 
Overconfidence Trade is unity in year t but not in year t-1, and zero otherwise. 
 We also use a media-based measure of overconfidence following Banerjee, Humphery-
Jenner, and Nanda (2015). The measure is based on keyword search for references to 
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confidence and non-confidence11 in the Factiva database for articles referring to the CEOs 
in The New York Times, Business Week, Financial Times, The Economist, Forbes 
Magazine, Fortune Magazine, and The Wall Street Journal. CEO Media Positivity is an 
indicator equal to 1 in the year if the number of ‘confident’ articles exceeds the number 
of ‘non-confident’ articles, and zero otherwise. Missing CEO Media Positivity values are 
set to zero. 
2.2 Measuring Supplier Commitment 
Following Kale and Shahrur (2007) and Raman and Shahrur (2008), we use suppliers’ 
R&D expenditure as a proxy for relationship-specific investment (RSI) by the supplier at 
each supplier-customer pair level, we calculate the proportion of a supplier’s R&D 
expenditures attributable to a customer based on the fraction of the supplier’s sales sold 
to the customer. Specifically, we define Supplier R&D Intensity as the product of supplier’s 
R&D expenditure and fraction of sales to the customer, normalized by the total assets of 
the supplier. The normalization allows for comparability across suppliers of different sizes. 
 The leadership of an overconfident CEO may induce supplier commitment by 
encouraging within-relationship cooperation and the easing of contractual frictions. 
Following Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006), we examine the durability of customer-
supplier relationships. Using survival analysis, we use the Andersen-Gill extension of the 
Cox model the termination of the relationship at a given point in time. The definitions of 
relationship status and econometric considerations are discussed in Section 3.3.2. 
2.3 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that 53.3% of our customer-years are helmed by Holder 67 
CEOs. In contrast, revelations of substantial change in CEO overconfidence (CEO 
Overconfidence Up) are only found in 6.8% of sample observations. Out of all customer-
supplier relationships, 57% of them are led by overconfident customer CEOs at least once 
during the life of the relationship. Departures of dependent suppliers (mean=7.5%) are 
similar to arrivals of dependent suppliers (mean=7.2%). Terminations and initiations of 
                                                            
11 References to confidence are overconfident, overconfidence, optimistic, and optimism. References to non-
confidence are reliable, cautious, conservative, practical, frugal, and steady.  
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supplier networks are rarer events, occurring in 3.5% and 3.3% of the sample observations, 
respectively. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Panel B of Table 1 partitions the sample firms into two groups - firms with and 
without dependent suppliers (i.e. standalone firms). Relative to the average standalone 
firm, the average firm with suppliers is significantly larger (by about 6 times), has higher 
valuation by the market-to-book ratio (3.82 vs 3.05), higher ROA (6.6% vs 5.0%), lower 
volatility in ROA (4.6% vs 5.5%), makes more capital expenditure (7.1% vs 6.5%) and 
has higher R&D intensity (4.8% vs 4.2%). Relative to the average standalone firm, the 
average firm with suppliers has higher leverage (24.6% vs 21.9%) and lower cash levels 
(9.8% vs 12.7%). The CEO of the average firm with suppliers has also a higher confidence 
level (i.e. greater vested in-the-money option holdings). Stock performance between the 2 
types of firms are not statistically different. 
3 Overconfident CEOs and Leadership Outcomes 
In this section, we test our main hypothesis  which we call the leadership hypothesis  that 
overconfident CEOs induce leadership outcomes. In our context, leadership outcomes are 
voluntary rather than delegated actions from formal authority. We assess the leadership 
hypothesis using the following tests. We examine the effect of overconfident CEOs on the 
probability of attracting dependent suppliers or initiating supplier networks. Next, we 
examine whether overconfident CEOs gain greater suppliers commitments by 1) analyzing 
in industries that are particularly reliant on stakeholder investment, 2) measuring 
suppliers’ relationship-specific investment, and 3) quantifying the durability of the 
relationship. Finally, we examine the possibility that these leadership outcomes destroy 
firm value. 
3.1 Do Overconfident CEOs Attract Suppliers? 
We begin by examining the effect of overconfident CEOs on the firm’s supplier network. 
Suppliers represent a key leadership outcome because they are vital to firm success and 
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cooperate voluntarily to provide inputs to the customer. We estimate a logistic regression 
model using equation (1): 
, 1, 1 2 , 1 ,i t t i t i tSupplier Increase α β CEOOverconfidence Measure β φ ε                (1) 
 Suppliers Increase is an indicator equal to one if the firm experiences an increase in 
the number of suppliers from year t-1 to t, and zero otherwise. The indicator variable 
allows an intuitive economic interpretation, although the results are also similar using an 
OLS model with the number of suppliers.12 We estimate this model using various CEO 
Overconfidence measures, described in details in Section 2 and the Appendix. φ represents 
a vector of control variables associated with supplier networks. The baseline regression 
specification includes year fixed effects to proxy for macro-economic trends and industry 
fixed effects to capture differences across industries following the approach in Malmendier, 
Tate, and Yan (2011). We cluster standard errors at the firm level. We expect β1 > 0 if 
CEO overconfidence attracts suppliers. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 The evidence suggests that suppliers respond strongly to the presence of an 
overconfident CEO. Column (1) of Panel A in Table 2 presents the result from a univariate 
logit model. With Holder 67 at t-1 as the CEO overconfidence measure, the coefficient 
estimate is positive and statically significant, indicating that a firm is more likely to 
attract additional suppliers when the CEO is overconfident. Economically, Holder 67 has 
a marginal effect of +1.2% on the likelihood of the firm experiencing an expansion of its 
supplier network. This represents an 18% increase over the sample frequency of supplier 
network expansions of 7.2%. 
The results are similar with the inclusion of firm characteristics in column (2). The 
coefficient estimate on Holder 67 remains positive and statically significant. The 
regressions include recent stock returns and an acquisition indicator as controls since 
Holder 67 may be related to recent stock performance and acquisition activity. The control 
variables indicate that customer firms are more likely to add suppliers when they have 
                                                            
12 These results are available upon request. 
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higher sales growth, higher R&D, lower leverage, and fewer existing suppliers. These 
patterns accord with the evidence in Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim (2008). Customer firms 
also have more suppliers when the customer reports missing R&D. This is an interesting 
finding because it is consistent with the view that firms that do not report R&D have 
innovation activity (Koh and Reeb, 2015). 
We create a sharper test of the leadership hypothesis by examining the timing of 
supplier actions. This test is important for two reasons. First, a direct corollary of the 
leadership hypothesis is that supplier actions should occur during periods when the CEO 
provides greater leadership. To measure the timing of leadership, we use the CEO 
Overconfidence Up measure which is an indicator equal to 1 when CEO Overconfidence 
is in the top quartile in year t but not so in year t-1. 
Second, this test may help address plausible alternative explanations. For example, 
underlying industry shocks may simulatenously increase demand and motivate 
overconfident CEOs to provide leadership. To capture time-varying industry-wide 
changes, we include industry-year fixed effects based on two-digit SIC codes. However, 
fixed effects can cause an incidental parameters problem in logit models. Therefore, we 
adopt a conditional logit model that stratifies observations along the industry-year 
dimension, sidestepping the incidental parameters problem. Inevitably, this causes 
fluctuations in sample size across different model specifications because we require 
variation within each stratum.13 
The conditional logit estimates suggest that suppliers react during times of leadership 
action. Column (3) shows that the coefficient estimate on CEO Overconfidence Up is 
positive and significant at the 1 percent statistical level. Standard errors are clustered at 
the industry strata because clustering must be on a greater dimension than the industry-
year stratum. Because the model includes industry-year strata, the results suggest that it 
is unlikely that industry shocks are the omitted variables that drive our main results. The 
                                                            
13 For example, when the stratification is industry fixed effects, the conditional logit model constrains the 
coefficient estimates to be equivalent across regressions in all industries. If a certain stratum experiences no 
variation in the dependent variable, all observations in that stratum are eliminated. This condition will 
result in variation in sample sizes across different specifications. 
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evidence also suggests that the timing of leadership is important – suppliers are more 
likely to come onboard during times when the CEO provides leadership. 
Another concern is unobserved underlying firm heterogeneity. Our baseline regressions 
partially address time-varying firm shocks with the inclusion of recent stock performance, 
sales growth, and growth prospects (i.e., market-to-book ratio). However, the possibility 
of an omitted unobservable underlying variable will always linger. Researchers 
traditionally address this issue by incorporating firm fixed effects, but the low within-firm 
variation in Holder 67 makes this approach infeasible. We propose a plausible approach 
to rule-out unobserved firm heterogeneity and sharpen the tests of the leadership 
hypothesis. Since the CEO Overconfidence Up measure captures the initial timing of the 
CEO’s leadership action, it is possible to estimate a conditional logit model with firm 
strata because there is sufficient within variation.  
The evidence suggests that our results are unlikely explained by unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. Column (4) shows that the coefficient estimate on CEO Overconfidence Up 
remains positive and significant with the inclusion of firm strata. This suggests that the 
link between overconfident CEO’s and suppliers’ actions is not due to unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. The inclusion of firm characteristics in the regression makes time-varying 
firm shocks an unlikely explanation for this relation. The evidence is consistent with the 
view that 1) suppliers are more likely to come onboard when the CEO provides leadership, 
and 2) unobserved firm heterogeneity is not behind our findings. 
3.1.1  Alternative Measures of CEO Overconfidence 
While the Holder 67 measure of overconfidence allows for convenient econometric 
interpretation, our findings are potentially sensitive to the construction of the Holder 67 
measure. Or, economically, suppliers may react to the degree of CEO leadership 
represented in the CEO’s option holdings. Therefore, we re-estimate the conditional logit 
model using the continuous measure of CEO Overconfidence similar to the approach 
developed in Campbell et al. (2011), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), and Hirshleifer, 
Low, and Teoh (2012).  
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The evidence suggests that the results are not sensitive to the indicator measure of 
in-the-money option holdings. Column (1) of Panel B shows that the coefficient estimate 
on CEO Overconfidence is positive and significant with the inclusion of firm strata. The 
result also implies that the degree of CEO option holdings affects the probability of gaining 
a dependent supplier. 
A related concern with option holdings-based measures is that excess holdings of in-
the-money options may reflect inaction or inertia rather than overconfidence or leadership. 
Because the measure relies on inactivity rather than activity, it may represent 
procrastination or inattention on the part of the CEO. We tackle this issue by following 
the approach in Kolasinski and Li (2013) to create a measure of CEO overconfidence 
based on action/activity. Using CEO insider transactions, we create an Overconfidence 
Trade Up measure which captures instances of overconfident CEO trading activity (See 
Section 2/Appendix for full details). 
The evidence supports the view that our earlier findings are not a result of CEO 
inaction or inattention. Using a conditional logit model with firm strata, we find that the 
coefficient estimate on Overconfidence Trade Up is positive and significant. This suggests 
that firms are likely to attract more suppliers during times when the CEO engages in 
overconfident insider transactions. It also demonstrates that our results are not sensitive 
to the measurement of CEO overconfidence as proposed in the extant literature. 
3.1.2  Do Suppliers Respond to the Withdrawal of Leadership? 
Our tests until this point focus on positive leadership outcomes as measured by an 
expansion in the dependent supplier network. A direct corollary of the leadership 
hypothesis is that supplier should also react when the CEO withdraws leadership. 
Examining the withdrawal of leadership may provide a more powerful test if there are 
lingering concerns regarding construction of the overconfidence measures. 
We measure withdrawal of leadership using the CEO Overconfidence Down measure, 
which is the analog of the CEO Overconfidence Up measure. To implement this test, we 
estimate the same industry-year strata conditional logit model as in Panel A, column (3), 
but replace the dependent variable with Supplier Decrease, which is an indicator equal to 
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1 if the firm experiences a decrease in the number of suppliers from year t-1 to t, and 0 
otherwise. 
The evidence suggests that suppliers respond strongly to the withdrawal of leadership 
by customer CEO. Column (3) of Panel B shows that the coefficient estimate on CEO 
Overconfidence Down is positive and statically significant. This implies that a firm is 
more likely to lose dependent suppliers when an overconfident CEO withdrawals 
leadership. Because the specification includes industry-year strata, it is unlikely that these 
results are due to industry shocks. Column (4) shows that the results are similar with the 
inclusion of firm strata, suggesting that unobserved firm heterogeneity is not likely behind 
our findings. 
3.1.3 Additional Test:  Initiation of Supplier Network 
As a sharper test of the leadership hypothesis, we examine the boundary scenario where 
firms attract their first dependent supplier. This helps to address a potential econometric 
issue that supplier relationships tend to be persistent. For example, Fee, Hadlock, and 
Thomas (2006) estimate a 76% probability that a customer-supplier relationship continues 
in the subsequent year.14 The pattern is similar in our sample, with 75% of customer-
supplier relationships continuing into the next year. 
To examine the initiation of a supplier network, we estimate our earlier analysis using 
Start of Supplier Network as the dependent variable. Start of Supplier Network is an 
indicator equal to one if a firm adds at least one dependent supplier in year t, but had no 
dependent supplier in year t–1. Table 3 presents the results of the regression analysis 
which follows the same specifications as before. 
[Insert Table 3] 
 The evidence suggests that overconfident CEOs strongly affects the initiations of 
supplier networks. Column (1) shows that Holder 67 is positively associated with Start of 
Supplier Network in a logistic regression with year dummies and industry dummies. 
                                                            
14 Holding control variables at their sample means in a logistic regression, Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) 
estimates that the probability of a relationship termination is about 24%. 
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Evaluated at the mean of the other independent variables, Holder 67 has a marginal effect 
of +0.8% on the likelihood of the firm experiencing a supplier network initiation. This 
represents a 24% increase over the sample frequency of supplier initiation of 3.3%. The 
results are similar with the inclusion of firm characteristics in Column (2). The economic 
effect remains relatively large. 
Next, we examine whether the timing of leadership relates to the initiation of a 
supplier network. To ensure that industry shocks are not driving both leadership and 
initiation of supplier networks, we estimate a conditional logit model with industry-year 
stratification. Using the CEO Overconfidence Up measure, column (3) shows that 
customers attract their first set of suppliers when the CEO provides strong leadership. 
This also suggests that our findings are not likely due to industry shocks. Column (4) 
shows that coefficient estimate on CEO Overconfidence Up remains positive and 
significant with the inclusion of firm strata. This indicates that unobserved firm 
heterogeneity is unlikely behind our findings. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the 
view that 1) suppliers are more likely to come onboard when the CEO provides leadership, 
and 2) our results are not due to the persistence in customer-supplier relationships. 
The overall findings in Section 3.1 provide strong support for the leadership 
hypothesis. The results indicate that CEO overconfidence has strong effects on the 
expansions and initiations of firms’ supplier networks. In particular, we find that the 
timing of leadership is important as supplier actions occur during times when the 
overconfident CEO provides the most leadership. Our results are also robust to various 
measures of CEO overconfidence and the use of industry-year and firm stratification in 
conditional logit models. 
3.2 Importance of Overconfident CEOs in Industries Requiring 
Intensive Relationship Specific Investment 
Certain businesses are particularly reliant upon suppliers to deliver customized inputs 
necessary for their final product. Consider for example the number of unique, customized 
parts in an iPhone. The customization of specialized inputs is commonly referred to as 
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relationship-specific investment (RSI). Given the value of supplier relationships in these 
industries, we examine whether overconfident CEOs are particularly important in 
attracting suppliers. Firms in durable goods manufacturing industries (i.e. durable sector) 
produce more unique products that can only be sold to few customers (e.g., Titman, 1984; 
Titman and Wessels, 1988). To the extent that firms in durable sector require greater 
customization in inputs from suppliers, CEO leadership may be particularly important in 
order to attract valuable suppliers onboard the firm and to induce greater supplier RSI. 
 We narrow our focus to only firms in manufacturing industries and separately analyze 
the durable sector and non-durable manufacturing sector. We employ the same empirical 
tests used in Tables 2 and 3 for both expansion and initiation of a supplier network. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results from logit regressions using the Holder 67 
measure of CEO overconfidence. As before, we include industry dummies and year 
dummies following Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011) and cluster standard errors by firm. 
The regressions include the full set of control variables as in Tables 2 and 3 but are 
suppressed to conserve space. Column (1) presents results from the durable sector sample, 
while Column (2) presents results from the non-durable sector. 
The evidence suggests that the leadership of overconfident CEOs is more valuable for 
the expansion of a supplier network in durable relative to non-durable industries. The 
coefficient estimate on Holder 67 is positive and significant at the 10% level in durable 
sector, while it is negative and insignificant in the non-durable sector shown in column 
(2). We also find similar patterns for the initiation of a supplier network. Column (3) 
shows that in the durable sector, the coefficient estimate on Holder 67 is positive and 
significant at the 10% significance level indicating that overconfident CEOs are more 
likely to initiate a supplier network. Column (4) shows that there is no relation in the 
non-durable sector. This evidence is consistent with the view that leadership by 
overconfident CEOs is particularly important when leadership outcomes are particularly 
valuable.  
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This analysis has generally weaker statistical power due to smaller sub-samples and 
the broad classification of durable/non-durable manufacturing sectors. To estimate a 
sharper test, we examine the timing of supplier actions using the CEO Overconfidence Up 
measure. As before, this measure allows for the estimation of the conditional logit model 
to capture unobserved industry shocks and firm heterogeneity.  
Panel B reports a stronger link in the durable sector between overconfident CEOs 
and supplier networks using the conditional logit model. Column (1) shows that the 
coefficient estimate on CEO Overconfidence Up is positive and significant at the 1% level 
in durable sector, while it is insignificant in the non-durable sector shown in column (2). 
Also, columns (3) show a strong association in the durable sector between overconfident 
CEOs and the initiation of a supplier network, but not for the non-durable sector. We 
present firm strata specifications to capture unobserved firm heterogeneity although the 
patterns are similar when including industry-year strata to account for industry shocks. 
The evidence is consistent with the view that the leadership of overconfident CEOs 
is more important when relationship-specific investment is particularly valuable to firm 
success. However, as previously noted, durable manufacturing is a broad classification. To 
more precisely evaluate the importance of RSI, we classify firms based on a measure of 
“contract intensity” within each industry. Contract intensity refers to the proportion of 
inputs in an industry that are neither bought nor sold on an exchange nor reference-priced 
(Nunn, 2007). Therefore, industries with higher contract intensity have more customized 
goods. To keep the analysis comparable to the durable/non-durable analysis above, we 
split firms into two groups based on the median contract intensity industry. We present 
results using both the Holder 67 and CEO Overconfidence Up measures of CEO 
overconfidence. 
The evidence suggests that the leadership of overconfident CEOs is particularly 
valuable in industries with high contract intensity. Panel C presents the results using 
Holder 67. Column (1) indicates that in industries with high contract intensity, the 
coefficient estimate on Holder 67 is positive and significant at the 10% level. This suggests 
that overconfident CEOs are associated with larger supplier networks in high contract 
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intensity industries. We find no significant association among firms in low contract 
intensity industries. The results are statistically stronger when examining supplier 
network initiation. Column (3) shows that in high contract intensity industries, 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to initiate supplier networks, while no such relation 
exists in low contract intensity industries (Column 4). 
The results are also similar using the CEO Overconfidence Up measure of CEO 
overconfidence. Panel D shows the coefficient estimates are positive and significant on 
CEO Overconfidence Up in high contract intensity industries (Columns (1) and (3)), but 
not in low contract intensity industries.  
Collectively, our evidence indicates that in industries that require relationship-specific 
inputs, leadership in the form CEO overconfidence is particularly important to the growth 
of supplier networks. In these industries, the cost of supplier commitment tends to be 
higher and contracting imperfections are likely to be more salient. Therefore, leadership 
may be particularly important. Our evidence in this section supports this view. 
3.3 Do Overconfident CEOs Attract Greater Supplier 
Commitments? 
The previous section examines the leadership hypothesis by exploiting industry variation 
in the degree of relationship-specific investment (RSI). Supplier relationships in these 
industries are on average more valuable because these inputs are costlier to develop and 
more difficult to re-deploy if the relationship terminates. RSI is also associated with value 
creation as it improves productivity (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000), enhances core competency 
(Parmigiani, 2007), and stimulates inter-project spillovers (Kang, Mahoney, and Tan, 
2009). Therefore, gaining voluntary cooperation in these industries suggests that suppliers 
believe in the leadership of the customer firm’s CEO. 
In this section, we search for more direct evidence of RSI at the individual customer-
supplier level. There are two compelling reasons for this analysis. First, focusing on 
customer-supplier relationships allows for a direct test of RSI commitments. Second, 
analyzing each customer-supplier relationship helps to attribute the variation among 
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individual suppliers for each customer. By examining the relative size between the 
customer and supplier, we can understand issues surrounding bargaining power. 
The challenge is that the nature of RSI is difficult to quantify. Therefore, we use two 
proxies for relationship-specific investment motivated from the existing literature: 1) 
Supplier R&D Intensity which captures the amount of research and development at the 
supplier firm (Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Raman and Shahrur, 2008) and 2) Relationship 
Durability which captures the likelihood of relationship termination at a given point in 
time (Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas, 2006). 
3.3.1 Supplier Commitments: R&D Intensity 
A proxy for a supplier’s relationship-specific investment is the amount of research and 
development activity (Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Raman and Shahrur, 2008). This captures 
the general production of asset-specific or non-commoditized outputs. To tie R&D activity 
to the customer-supplier relationship, we implement the following procedure. First, we 
scale the supplier’s R&D activity by its sales relationship with the customer.15 To allow 
for comparability across suppliers of different size, we normalize by total assets and apply 
the natural logarithm transformation to minimize the influence of outliers.16 We call this 
measure Supplier R&D Intensity. Since the measure is continuous, we estimate an OLS 
regression using equation (2). 
, 1 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 ,67i t t i t i t i tSupplier R & D Intensity α β Holder β φ β γ ε                            (2) 
[Insert Table 5] 
φ represents a vector of supplier control variables while γ represents a vector of 
customer control variables. The regression specification includes industry fixed effects to 
capture differences in R&D activity across industries and time fixed effects to capture 
macro-economic trends. We cluster standard errors by customer-year because each 
customer may have multiple suppliers in a given year. The regressions include customer 
                                                            
15 For example, if a firm has $100 in R&D activity and 40% of its sales are to a single customer, then we 
attribute $100*0.4=$40 to this particular relationship. 
16 Our results are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar using the raw values and are available upon 
request. 
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characteristics and supplier characteristics that are potentially associated with R&D 
activity. We expect β1 > 0 if CEO overconfidence attracts suppliers. 
Table 5 presents the results. The evidence suggests that suppliers to customer firms 
with overconfident CEO produce greater R&D intensity. Column (1) shows that β1 is 
positive and significant with the inclusion of customer firm characteristics. β1 is also 
positive and significant after including a full set of supplier firm characteristics in Column 
(2), suggesting that supplier characteristics are not driving our findings. Together, the 
evidence is consistent with the view that CEOs attract greater supplier commitments. 
From this customer-supplier pair setting, we can explore the influence of relative size 
between customers and suppliers to provide evidence on the leadership channel of 
overconfident CEOs. Typically, when suppliers are smaller than their major customers, 
they tend to have less bargaining power in the supply chain relationship. While locking 
in a larger supplier may secure revenues, smaller suppliers run the risk of ex-post hold-up 
problems due to their relatively weaker bargaining positions. Therefore, smaller suppliers 
may require additional assurances, in particular when relationship specific investments 
are required. The leadership of overconfident CEOs may provide one such channel. By 
holding in-the-money options, the overconfident CEO may be less likely to hold-up the 
smaller supplier because delays along the supply-chain may significantly affect the CEO’s 
personal wealth.  
To test this hypothesis, we classify suppliers by their asset sizes relative to their 
customers. A supplier is classified as small (big) if the Supplier-Customer Size Ratio is 
lower (higher) than the SIC 2-digit industry median value. The evidence presented in 
column (3) suggests that overconfident CEOs strongly affect supplier R&D intensity 
among smaller suppliers, but have little impact among large suppliers as seen in Column 
(4). This evidence is consistent with the view that the leadership of overconfident CEOs 
may convince smaller suppliers to make relationship-specific investments when there are 
potentially bargaining power issues at hand. 
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3.3.2 Supplier Commitments: Relationship Durability 
Another dimension of supplier commitment is the durability of the customer-supplier 
relationship. Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) propose that the durability of customer-
supplier relationship relates to contractual frictions which may arise from RSI-related 
issues or hold-up problems. If the leadership of overconfident CEOs helps to alleviates 
frictions, we expect that these relationships are less likely to terminate, ceteris paribus.  
To model the durability of customer-supplier relationships, we use survival analysis 
to estimate a hazard function. Specifically, we estimate the probability that a customer-
supplier relationship terminates within a time interval conditional on the survival of the 
relationship up till the beginning of that interval. However, standard hazard function are 
not appropriate in our setting because a customer-supplier relationship may terminate 
then restart in the future.17 It is also not statistically appropriate to model multiple 
terminations of a single relationship as separate observations since terminations within a 
customer-supplier pair may be correlated. In light of these constraints, we employ the 
Andersen-Gill extension of the standard Cox model (Andersen and Gill, 1982). Like the 
Cox model, the Andersen-Gill extension adjusts for censoring in the data but it provides 
two important advantages. First, it can accommodate recurrent terminations in customer-
supplier relationships. Second, it can generalize to hazard non-proportionality which we 
exploit to check the assumption of hazard proportionality, a hallmark of the standard Cox 
model. 
To study the association between customer CEO leadership and relationship 
durability, we define Holder 67 Relationship equal to 1 if a Holder 67 customer CEO is 
present between the start and termination of the relationship, and 0 otherwise. Holder 67 
Relationship is re-computed for relationships with subsequent restarts and terminations. 
All other independent variables are based on relationship and firm characteristics in the 
first year of the customer-supplier relationship. Our definition of customer-supplier 
                                                            
17 The information between the restart and the subsequent termination is not admissible in a standard Cox 
model. A potential workaround is to perform survival analysis till the occurrence of the first termination 
and discard all subsequent information. However, this solution entails a suboptimal use of our data because 
more than 25% of unique customer-supplier pairs have a terminate-restart characteristic. 
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relationship length follows Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) closely. The start of a 
relationship is defined to be the first year in which both customer and supplier are linked 
in the Compustat business segment file. We follow the relationship till the year in which 
the link is broken (termination year). If both firms are present in Compustat in the 
termination year, we determine that the customer-supplier relationship is terminated. If 
at least one of the firms disappear from Compustat in the termination year, we accord 
the relationship with a right-censored status because we cannot determine if a relationship 
is terminated mutually. Since our sample period ends in 2012, we also classify all surviving 
relationships in 2012 as being right-censored. Furthermore, as it may take at least 2 years 
for a customer CEO to be classified as a Holder 67 CEO, we only include relationships 
that begin on or after 1995. 
[Insert Table 6] 
Table 6 presents the results as hazard ratios, which represents the ratio of hazard 
rates corresponding to two levels of the variable.18 For example, a hazard ratio above 
unity (below unity) implies that the variable increases (decreases) the chance of 
relationship termination at that point in time.  
The evidence suggests that overconfident CEOs have longer supplier relationships on 
average. Column (1) shows that the hazard of a relationship termination is about 10.8% 
lower in a Holder 67 Relationship relative to a Non-Holder 67 Relationship and is highly 
statistically significant. In Column (2), the Holder 67 Relationship continues to be 
associated with lower hazards of relationship termination with the inclusion of supplier 
and customer control variables which we suppress to conserve space. In this specification, 
the hazard of a relationship termination is about 19.5% lower in a Holder 67 Relationship 
relative to a Non-Holder 67 Relationship. Column (3) shows the results are also unchanged 
after including Beginning Size Ratio, Beginning Supplier R&D Intensity, and Beginning 
Sales Dependency. The customer-supplier relationship is less likely to terminate when the 
                                                            
18 Likewise, the hazard ratio of a continuous variable represents the ratio of hazard rates corresponding to 
a unit-change in the said variable. 
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supplier has high initial beginning sales dependency. This is economically sensible as more 
dependent suppliers are more reliant on their major customer. 
Next, we verify that the assumption of hazard proportionality holds in the model. 
Recall that hazards of relationship termination are interpreted at every point in time but 
the model only yields a single estimated coefficient per independent variable. This 
observation encapsulates the hazard proportionality implied in the standard Cox model 
which assumes that hazard ratios are constant through time. The Andersen-Gill extension 
relaxes this assumption by making it possible to include interaction terms between 
independent variables and time, also widely known as time-varying covariates. The 
interaction terms allow the effect of their corresponding independent variables to change 
with time elapsed in the relationship. Therefore, we test whether these interaction terms 
are not statistically significant. 
The evidence confirms that hazard proportionality is not violated in our model. We 
add interaction terms of all independent variables with time in Column (4). Holder 67 
Relationship continues to predict a lower hazard of relationship termination (-29.2%) but 
the effect of its interaction with time is not statistically distinguishable from zero. This 
result both confirms our findings in the previous columns and verifies that the assumption 
of hazard proportionality is upheld in our model. In Column (5), we restrict our sample 
to customer-supplier relationships without any restarts (i.e. only 1 termination) and find 
that our conclusions on Holder 67 Relationship remain unchanged. 
3.4 Do Supplier Commitments Represent a ‘Dark-side’ of CEO 
Overconfidence? 
The results in this section support a ‘bright-side’ view that the leadership of overconfident 
CEOs creates valuable supplier relationships along various dimensions. However, if 
overconfident CEOs are over-optimistic and overpay for these supplier commitments, 
these ‘achievements’ may ultimately hurt the company’s bottom line and sacrifice firm 
value. This would represent a ‘dark-side’ view of CEO overconfidence. 
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We create two tests to examine the possibility that overconfident CEOs overpay for 
their supplier commitments. First, we examine input costs and markup percentage to test 
whether overconfident CEOs overpay their suppliers. These measures capture gross 
profitability and buying power (Fee and Thomas, 2004). Firms that overpay suppliers 
tend to exhibit weak buying power and low profitability. Second, we examine stock returns 
to directly measure value effects. The ‘dark-side’ view would imply that these supplier 
commitments come at a significant cost, destroying firm value and producing poor stock 
performance. 
3.4.1 Input Costs and Gross Profitability 
Following Thomas and Fee (2004), we measure buying power using input costs defined as 
the cost of goods sold (COGS) divided by total sales. All else equal, firms that overpay 
suppliers tend to have weak buying power and pay higher input costs. We also use a 
related measure – markup percentage – defined as total sales minus cost of goods sold 
(COGS) divided by COGS. If overconfident CEOs overpay for supplier commitments, this 
decreases the markup of their final products, all else equal. We test whether overconfident 
CEOs overpay for their supplier commitments by estimating OLS regressions following 
equation (3). 
    , 1 1 2 , 1 ,67i t t i t i tMargin α β Holder β φ ε   (3)
where Margin represents either Input Costs or Markup Percentage defined above. φ 
represents a vector of control variables. In all specifications, we include industry-year fixed 
effects to capture cross-sectional variation in Input Costs or Markup Percentage across 
industries. Since we are interested in examining the possibility of overpaying suppliers, we 
only consider observations with at least one supplier in each of both year t and year t-1. 
After applying this constraint, our subsample comprises 422 unique firms from the years 
1994 to 2011, yielding a panel of 2,244 firm-years across 29 2-digit SIC industries. 
[Insert Table 7] 
The results in Table 7 are inconsistent with the ‘dark-side’ view. Column (1) shows 
that the coefficient estimate on Holder 67 is negative and statistically significant, 
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indicating that Input Costs are lower for firms with overconfident CEOs. This results 
suggests that overconfident CEOs tend to have greater bargaining power. While it may 
be impossible to objectively quantify ‘overpayment’ - particularly if inputs are asset-
specific - the evidence suggests that operating profitability is at least not compromised. A 
firm led by an overconfident CEO has a -2.3% lower Input Costs relative to the sample 
mean. Column (2) shows that our conclusions are unchanged using Markup Percentage. 
Controlling for input costs, firms led by overconfident CEOs command higher prices for 
their products. Economically, Holder67 is associated with a +16.2% higher Markup 
Percentage relative to the sample mean.19  
In sum, the evidence is inconsistent with the view that supplier commitments elicited 
by overconfident CEOs destroy firm value. While we cannot definitively rule out 
overpayment for supplier commitments, the evidence generally points in the opposite 
direction. Firms led by overconfident CEOs tend to have greater buying power and gross 
profitability, as measured by Input Costs and Markup Percentage. These findings tend to 
support the ‘bright-side’ view that overconfident CEOs generate valuable leadership 
outcomes. 
3.4.2 Stock Performance of Firms with Dependent Suppliers 
In our second test, we directly examine value effects of CEO leadership in firms with 
dependent suppliers using stock returns. If overconfident CEOs secure supplier 
commitments at great costs, this is likely to generate poor future stock performance. On 
the other hand, we expect equity outperformance if the leadership outcomes of 
overconfident CEOs are value-creating. Therefore, we test the opposing ‘dark-side’ and 
‘bright-side’ predictions by forming portfolios and tracking stock performance using the 
following procedure. 
 We restrict our sample to observations with at least one disclosed supplier at the 
fiscal year end. We allocate firms into either the Holder67 (Non-Holder67) portfolio if the 
                                                            
19 The sample means referred in Columns (1) and (2) are computed only among firms with at least one 
supplier in the current year and at least one supplier in the previous year. Due to this constraint, the sample 
size in Table 7 is smaller than that in Table 2.  
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CEO is (is not) overconfident at the fiscal year end. The firm stays in the portfolio for 
the next 12 months. We calculate the average returns of the stocks in the two portfolios 
each month and benchmark them against the Fama-French 5 factors and the momentum 
factor. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 Figure 1 presents the results. The evidence strongly supports the ‘bright-side’ 
leadership hypothesis. Panel A presents the average monthly alphas of the Holder67 
portfolio, Non-Holder67 portfolio, and the difference in returns between the two portfolios. 
The Holder67 portfolio yields a statistically significant monthly alpha of 0.38%, while the 
alpha of the Non-Holder67 portfolio is not statistically significant. The long-short portfolio 
yields a statistically significant monthly alpha of 0.27%. Our results are also similar using 
characteristics-adjusted returns (DGTW), and are available upon request. 
We also present the factor loadings of the Holder67, Non-Holder67, and the long-short 
portfolio in Panel B. Notably, firms helmed by both overconfident and non-overconfident 
CEOs have similar loadings on SMB, suggesting that they are similar in size. However, 
the factor loading on HML is negative for firms led by overconfident CEOs and positive 
for their counterparts. This suggests that stocks in the Non-Holder67 portfolio tend to be 
value firms. These firms also tend to be more conservative in their corporate investment 
activities as they have a positive and significant loadings on CMA. We note that firms in 
the Holder67 portfolio are not necessarily aggressive in their investment activities as the 
factor loading on CMA is close to zero (0.029). 
Panel C examines manufacturing firms in the durable/non-durable industries. Within 
this subsample, only firms in the durable industries generate significant alphas. The 
Holder67 portfolio yields an alpha of 0.58% while the Non-Holder67 portfolio is not 
statistically significant. In the non-durable industries, the alphas in the two portfolios are 
positive but not statistically distinguishable from zero. Similarly, we also find that the 
outperformance of the Holder67 portfolio is more pronounced in the high-RSI industries 
than in the low-RSI industries, although the differences are not significant. The patterns 
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in Panels C and D are consistent with our findings in Table 4 that the influence of CEO 
leadership on supplier actions is stronger in industries where RSI is more valuable. 
Overall, the evidence from our stock performance analysis is not consistent with the 
‘dark-side’ view that overconfident CEOs overpay for their supplier commitments. 
Instead, the positive stock performance supports the leadership hypothesis. Among firms 
with dependent suppliers, the market reacts favorably to those led by overconfident CEOs. 
This suggests that these leadership outcomes are value-enhancing. 
4 Additional Test and Discussion 
In this section, we provide additional evidence in support of the leadership hypothesis. 
We examine whether suppliers are sensitive to the manner with which CEOs express 
overconfidence. We also discuss alternative explanations for our findings. 
4.1 Does the Manner of Leadership Matter? 
As previously discussed, overconfident behavior of CEOs provides leadership through 
three potential channels: 1) communicating a strong belief in the firm’s prospects, 2) 
setting an example, and 3) displaying commitment. However, there are other ways that 
overconfident CEOs can demonstrate leadership. 
 One notable manner are positive public statements to the news media. Such verbal 
communication can also provide leadership, particularly when the interests of both parties 
are perfectly aligned (e.g., Farrell and Rabin, 1996). In this scenario, words are sufficient 
to induce commitments from stakeholders since stakeholders deduce that the CEO has no 
incentives to lie. Following Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner, and Nanda (2015), we use a news-
based measure of CEO overconfidence – CEO Media Positivity  based on the relative 
frequency of confident articles to non-confident articles describing the CEO. Since this 
measure is independent of the CEOs’ option exercise behavior, it captures CEO 
overconfidence that is exuded through verbal communication. 
[Insert Table 8] 
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We examine the effect of CEO Media Positivity on expansion of supplier networks in 
Table 8. In Column (1), we find that while the association between CEO Media Positivity 
and Supplier Increase is positive, it is not statistically significant. We pit Holder 67 against 
CEO Media Positivity in Column (2) in a horse-race regression. Though both variables 
predict Supplier Increase positively, only Holder 67 is statistically significant. Next, we 
partition firms based on their membership in the durable and non-durable manufacturing 
sectors (Titman and Wessels, 1988), and perform a split-sample analysis. Consistent with 
our prior findings in Table 4, Holder 67 predicts expansions of supplier networks only 
among firms in the durable manufacturing sectors. On both sides of the split-sample 
analysis, CEO Media Positivity is not a statistically significant predictor of Supplier 
Increase. Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that stakeholders are more 
likely to be influenced by CEO leadership that is exuded by costly option-exercise behavior 
but not verbal media statements. 
4.2 Alternative Explanation: Corporate Activity 
An alternative interpretation of our findings is that stakeholder commitments result 
from the tendency of overconfident CEOs to over-invest, engage in M&A activities, and 
pursue innovation projects (Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Galasso and Simcoe, 2011; 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012). These types of corporate activities may mechanically 
attract new suppliers, possibly explaining our findings. For example, an increase in 
acquisition activity may attract more suppliers in the next period. 
While increasing corporate activities may increase the number of suppliers, it is not 
clear that such actions are sufficient to induce costly relationship-specific investment 
(RSI). Suppliers who produce such goods must be convinced that the leadership of the 
CEO will deliver long-term value. Notably, our results are most pronounced for RSI-
intensive firms/industries. Second, our results are robust after controlling for M&A 
activities. Third, while the results are consistent with an innovation channel, innovation 
is inherently risky. Stakeholders must be convinced to take these risks and follow the 
CEO’s vision. Overall, it seems unlikely that heighted corporate activity can fully explain 
our findings.  
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4.3 Do CEOs take cues from suppliers? 
 An alternative explanation is that our results may be due to a reverse causality 
explanation where the CEO take cues from suppliers’ actions. In this scenario, suppliers 
cause the CEO of the customer firm to become overconfident. We find this explanation 
unlikely for two reasons. First, in our customer-supplier sample, customer are significantly 
larger than suppliers. Thus, it is less likely that customer CEOs are influenced by 
suppliers’ actions. Second, while it is certainly possible that suppliers deliver the vision to 
a customer, it would make more economic sense that the vision originates from the 
customer CEO who subsequently finds suppliers to support the vision. It is after the vision 
is established that the customers and suppliers may share ideas along the supply-chain 
(e.g., Chu, Tian, and Wang, 2015). Our evidence also supports this idea. 
5 Conclusion 
CEOs are hired for their vision and leadership talent. Yet, leadership has many dimensions 
and definitions, which makes this ability difficult to define and systematically analyze. 
We hypothesize that corporate boards hire overconfident CEOs because they are better 
leaders. Our study provides a tractable empirical setting where supplier commitments 
represent valuable leadership outcomes. Leadership is distinct from formal authority 
because stakeholders’ actions are voluntary. 
Our evidence suggests that overconfident CEOs are better able to attract suppliers to 
commit to the CEO’s vision. Overconfident CEOs attract supplier relationships, 
particularly when such relationship are valuable, such as in durable goods manufacturing 
industries and high relationship-specificity industries. Suppliers also more likely to provide 
relationship-specific products to suppliers when the supplier CEO is overconfident. 
Overall, our results reveal a bright side of CEO overconfidence. This provides a 
potential explanation for why boards appoint overconfident CEOs. While overconfidence 
is often perceived as a negative trait, future research may explore additional positive 
dimensions of CEO overconfidence.  
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Appendix I. Variable Definitions 
CEO Overconfidence t Average value of the CEO's options scaled by the average strike price. The numerator is the value of the CEO's vested and 
unexercised options (EXECUCOMP: OPT UNEX EXER VAL) scaled by the number of such options (EXECUCOMP: OPT 
UNEX EXER NUM). The denominator is the difference between the firm's stock price at the end of the fiscal year (CRSP: 
PRCC F) and the numerator. Source: Campbell et al. (2011), Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2011), Hirshleifer et al. (2012), 
Execucomp, CRSP 
CEO Overconfidence Up t-1, t Variable equates to unity if CEO Overconfidence in year t is in the top quartile of the sample and if CEO Overconfidence in 
the year t-1 is not in the top quartile of the sample, and equates to 0 otherwise. Source: Execucomp, CRSP 
Overconfidence Trade t Dummy variable that equates to unity in year t if the CEO’s purchases over the next 2 years have negative 180-day BHARs 
on average, and equates to zero otherwise. Source: Kolasinski & Li (2013) 
Overconfidence Trade Up t-1, t Dummy variable that equates to unity if OC Trade (see above) is zero in year t-1 and is unity in year t, and equates to zero 
otherwise. Source: Kolasinski & Li (2013), Thomson Reuters Insiders 
Holder 67 t-1 Variable equates to unity if a CEO’s vested option holdings are at least 67% in-the-money on at least 2 instances (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2005; Malmendier et al., 2011), and equates to zero otherwise. Variable switches from zero to unity from the first 
such instance. Source: Execucomp, CRSP 
Holder 67 Relationship s, i For a given customer-supplier relationship, variable equates to unity if a Holder 67 customer CEO is incumbent in any year 
between the start (inclusive) and end (exclusive) of the relationship, and equates to zero otherwise. Source: Execucomp, 
CRSP, Compustat 
CEO Media Positivity t Dummy variable that equates to unity if the number of articles containing references to confidence is more than the number 
of articles containing references to non-confidence during the year, and equates to zero otherwise (Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner, 
and Nanda, 2015). Source: Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner, and Nanda (2015) 
Industry Relationship-Specificity j Proportion of inputs used in I-O industry that are neither sold on organized exchanges nor reference-priced. Readers may 
refer to Nunn (2007) for more details. Source: Nunn (2007) 
CEO Stock Ownership t-1, t CEO's percentage share ownership in year t-1. Source: Execucomp 
Total Assets t-1 Total Assets of firm. Source: Compustat
Leverage t-1 Sum of long-term debt and short-term debt, scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat
Market-to-Book Ratio t-1 Ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. Source: Compustat
Return on Assets t-1 Ratio of net income to assets. Source: Compustat
Sales Growth t-1 Difference between sales in year (t-1) and year (t-2), scaled by sales in year (t-2). Source: Compustat
Capital Expenditure t-1 Capital expenditure of firm, scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat
R&D t-1 R&D expenses of customer firm, scaled by total assets. Missing R&D expenses are set to zero. Source: Compustat
Missing R&D t-1 Dummy variable that equates to unity if R&D expenses are missing in the Compustat database, and equates to 0 otherwise. 
Source: Compustat 
CEO Tenure t-1 If the date of appointment as CEO is available in Execucomp, variable equates to the number of years elapsed since the 
appointment date. Otherwise, variable equates to the number of years elapsed since the earliest date where the CEO first 
appears in the database. Source: Execucomp 
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Appendix I. (Continued) 
2-Year Stock Returns t-2, t-1 Buy-and-hold returns of firm stock from beginning of year (t-2) to end of fiscal year (t-1). Source: CRSP
ROA Volatility t-3, t-1 3-year standard deviation of ROA from year (t-3) to year (t-1). Source: Compustat
Cash t-1 Cash holdings of firm, scaled by total assets. Source: Compustat 
Acquisitions t-1, t Variable equates to unity if the firm performs at least 1 acquisition within the (t-1, t) window, and equates to zero 
otherwise. Source: SDC Platinum  
Suppliers Increase t-1, t Variable equates to unity if the number of dependent suppliers in year (t) is higher than the number of dependent 
suppliers in year (t-1), and equates to 0 otherwise. Source: Compustat 
Suppliers Decrease t-1, t Variable equates to unity if the number of dependent suppliers in year (t) is lower than the number of dependent suppliers 
in year (t-1), and equates to 0 otherwise. Source: Compustat 
Start of Supplier Network t-1, t Variable equates to unity if firm has at least one dependent supplier in year (t) and has no dependent supplier in year 
(t-1), and equates to 0 otherwise. Source: Compustat 
End of Supplier Network t-1, t Variable equates to unity if firm has no dependent supplier in year (t) and has at least one dependent supplier in year 
(t-1), and equates to 0 otherwise. Source: Compustat 
Supplier Sales Dependency s, i, t For each supplier-customer pair in a year, supplier sales dependency is defined as the ratio of supplier-customer sales to 
total supplier sales. Source: Compustat 
Supplier R&D Intensity s, i, t For each supplier-customer pair in a year, we first compute the supplier’s R&D activity that is attributable to the 
customer by multiplying supplier’s R&D expenses by Supplier Sales Dependency (see above for definition). Thereafter, 
we normalize the resulting value by the total assets of the supplier. To facilitate presentation, values are inflated by a 
factor of 1000. Source: Compustat 
Durable Firm j Industries whose SIC codes are between 3400 and 3999. Source: Titman and Wessels (1988)
Non-Durable Firm j Industries whose SIC codes are between 2000 and 3399. Source: Titman and Wessels (1988)
High RSI j Industries whose Industry Relationship-Specificity values are higher than the sample median. Source: Nunn (2007)
Low RSI j Industries whose Industry Relationship-Specificity values are lower than the sample median. Source: Nunn (2007)
Input Costs t Ratio of cost of goods sold to total sales. Source: Compustat 
Markup Percentage t Ratio of the difference between total sales and cost of goods sold to cost of goods sold. Source: Compustat
Supplier-Customer Size Ratio s, i, t For each customer-supplier pair in a year, Supplier-Customer Size Ratio is computed as the ratio of total assets of the 
supplier to that of the customer. Supplier-Customer Size Ratio is defined to be small (big) if it is lower (higher) than the 
SIC 2-digit industry median value. Source: Compustat 
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Figure 1. 
Figure 1 reports monthly alphas of portfolios of firms led by overconfident/ non-overconfident 
CEOs. Our sample is restricted to observations with at least one supplier in each of both year t 
and year t-1. We allocate each firm to the Holder67 (Non-Holder67) portfolio if the CEO is (is 
not) identified as Holder67 at the end of its fiscal year. The firm remains in the portfolio over the 
next 12 months. We calculate average return of the stocks each portfolio and benchmark against 
the Fama-French 5 factors and the momentum factor. Holder67 is a dummy variable which 
equates to unity if the CEO’s vested option holdings are at least 67% in-the-money on at least 2 
instances (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier et al., 2011), and equates to zero otherwise. 
Holder67 switches from zero to unity from the first such instance.  
Panel A presents the monthly alphas of the Holder67 portfolio, the Non-Holder67 portfolio, and 
the long-short portfolio. Panel B presents the loadings and standard errors of each portfolio on 
the 6 risk factors. Panel C repeats the above analysis separately for firms in the durable/non-
durable industries. Following Titman and Wessels (1988), durable industries have SIC codes 3400-
3999 and non-durable industries have SIC codes 2000-3399. Panel D separates firms by their 
membership in high-RSI/low-RSI industries. We determine industry-level relationship specificity 
according to the year 1997 contract intensity variable from Nunn (2007). An industry is classified 
as high (low)-RSI if its industry contract intensity is above (below) the sample median. ***, **, * 
represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. Portfolio Monthly Alphas for Firms Led by Overconfident/Non-
Overconfident CEOs 
 
 
 
Holder67 Non-
Holder67 
Diff.
0.381***
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0.265*
0.000
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0.200
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%
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Figure 1. (Continued) 
Panel B. Portfolio Loadings on Fama-French 5 Factors + Momentum Factor 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Portfolio Holder67 Non-
Holder67 
Difference 
α 0.381*** 0.116 0.265* 
(0.127) (0.120) (0.146) 
MKT – RF 1.091*** 1.076*** 0.015 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.037) 
SMB 0.469*** 0.468*** 0.000 
(0.046) (0.043) (0.053) 
HML -0.107 0.125** -0.232*** 
(0.065) (0.062) (0.075) 
RMW 0.155** 0.236*** -0.082 
(0.063) (0.060) (0.073) 
CMA 0.029 0.157** -0.128 
(0.076) (0.072) (0.087) 
MOM -0.232*** -0.260*** 0.028 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.028) 
Months 234 234 234 
R-squared 0.909 0.906 0.294 
 
Panel C. Durable/ Non-Durable Industries Portfolio Monthly Alphas 
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Figure 1. (Continued) 
Panel D. High/ Low-RSI Industries Portfolio Monthly Alphas 
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Table 1. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A reports the summary statistics of the sample used in our baseline regression in Column 
(2) of Table 2 Panel A. Financial variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce 
the influence of outliers. 
Panel A. Summary Statistics for Sample Firms 
 N Mean S.D. P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
Holder 67 14745 0.533 0.499 0 0 1 1 1
CEO Overconfidence 14745 0.321 0.262 0 0.075 0.289 0.516 0.703
CEO Overconfidence Up 14179 0.068 0.253 0 0 0 0 0
Holder 67 Relationship 4974 0.570 0.495 0 0 1 1 1
CEO Media Positivity 7923 0.810 0.392 0 1 1 1 1
CEO Stock Ownership 14745 2.021 4.917 0 0 0.21 1.35 5.63
Total Assets 14745 4088 8760 190 408 1066 3225 10219
Leverage 14745 0.224 0.201 0 0.050 0.202 0.335 0.464
Market-to-Book Ratio 14745 3.204 2.904 1.075 1.580 2.365 3.703 5.947
Return on Assets 14745 0.053 0.108 -0.052 0.019 0.062 0.105 0.158
Sales Growth 14745 0.124 0.269 -0.123 0.001 0.087 0.198 0.387
Capital Expenditure 14745 0.066 0.068 0.013 0.025 0.045 0.081 0.138
R&D20 14745 0.043 0.068 0 0 0.010 0.062 0.134
Missing R&D Indicator 14745 0.420 0.494 0 0 0 1 1
Cash 14745 0.121 0.144 0.009 0.024 0.070 0.164 0.298
ROA Volatility 14745 0.054 0.069 0.007 0.014 0.030 0.064 0.125
CEO Tenure 14745 1.751 0.855 0.693 1.099 1.792 2.398 2.833
2-Year Stock Returns 14745 0.373 1.279 -0.474 -0.186 0.164 0.605 1.236
Acquisitions 14745 0.355 0.478 0 0 0 1 1
Durable Indicator 14745 0.336 0.472 0 0 0 1 1
Non-Durable Indicator 14745 0.270 0.444 0 0 0 1 1
Industry Relationship-Specificity 8360 0.643 0.225 0.311 0.503 0.694 0.826 0.931
Customer-Supplier Size Ratio 12002 0.081 0.386 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.039 0.146
High C-S Size Ratio 12002 0.487 0.500 0 0 0 1 1
High-RSI Indicator 8360 0.531 0.499 0 0 1 1 1
Suppliers Increase 14745 0.072 0.258 0 0 0 0 0
Suppliers Decrease 14745 0.075 0.264 0 0 0 0 0
Start of Supplier Network 14745 0.033 0.180 0 0 0 0 0
End of Supplier Network 14745 0.035 0.183 0 0 0 0 0
Input Costs 2244 0.606 0.218 0.269 0.451 0.657 0.769 0.865
Markup Percentage 2244 1.093 1.481 0.155 0.300 0.522 1.219 2.723
Supplier R&D Intensity 12002 23.213 48.114 0.654 2.083 7.652 21.417 52.577
 
                                                            
20 Missing values of R&D are assigned to be zero. Reported statistics exclude missing R&D values. 
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Table 1 (Continued)  
In Panel B, we compare the variable means of firm-year observations with (Customer) and without 
(Non-Customer) dependent suppliers. The following statistics are drawn from the sample used in 
the baseline regression in Column (2) of Table 2 Panel A. ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance of differences in means at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel B. Comparison between Customer and Non-Customer Observations 
 Customer Non-Customer  
 N Mean N Mean Difference 
Holder 67 2904 0.545 11841 0.531 0.014
CEO Overconfidence 2904 0.343 11841 0.315 0.028***
CEO Overconfidence Up 2804 0.065 11375 0.069 -0.004
CEO Stock Ownership 2904 1.123 11841 2.241 -1.118***
Total Assets 2904 12394 11841 2051 10343***
Leverage 2904 0.246 11841 0.219 0.026***
Market-to-Book Ratio 2904 3.824 11841 3.052 0.771***
Return on Assets 2904 0.066 11841 0.050 0.015***
Sales Growth 2904 0.132 11841 0.121 0.010**
Capital Expenditure 2904 0.071 11841 0.065 0.006***
R&D 2904 0.048 11841 0.042 0.006***
CEO Tenure 2904 0.930 11841 0.959 -0.028***
Cash 2904 0.098 11841 0.127 -0.029***
ROA Volatility 2904 0.046 11841 0.055 -0.009***
2-Year Stock Returns 2904 0.407 11841 0.365 0.042
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Table 2. 
The Effect of CEO Overconfidence on the Increase/Decrease in Suppliers 
This table presents results from logit and conditional logit regressions. In Panel A, the dependent 
variable is Suppliers Increase. Supplier Increase is a dummy variable that equates to unity if a 
firm has more dependent suppliers in year t than it has in t-1, and equates to zero otherwise. 
Dependent suppliers are defined according to SFAS 14. The key independent variables are CEO 
Overconfidence Up and Holder 67. CEO Overconfidence is per-option value of CEO’s vested and 
unexercised options scaled by average strike price (Campbell et al., 2011; Malmendier, Tate, and 
Yan, 2011; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012). CEO Overconfidence Up is a dummy variable that 
equates to unity if the continuous CEO Overconfidence in year t is in the top quartile of the 
sample and CEO Overconfidence in t-1 is not in the top quartile of the sample, and equates to 
zero otherwise. Holder 67 is a dummy variable which equates to unity if the CEO’s vested option 
holdings are at least 67% in-the-money on at least 2 instances (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 
Malmendier et al., 2011), and equates to zero otherwise. Holder 67 switches from zero to unity 
from the first such instance. Columns (1) and (2) present results from a logit model while Columns 
(3) and (4) present results from a conditional logit model. In Panel B, we add Suppliers Decrease 
as a dependent variable. Suppliers Decrease is defined symmetrically to Suppliers Increase (see 
above). Apart from CEO Overconfidence and CEO Overconfidence Up, we add Overconfidence 
Trade Up and CEO Overconfidence Down as key independent variables. Following Kolasinski and 
Li (2013), OC Trade is a dummy variable that equates to unity in year t if the CEO’s purchases 
over the next 2 years have negative 180-day BHARs on average, and equates to zero otherwise. 
BHARs are benchmarked against returns of Fama-French size-decile portfolios, and equates to 
zero otherwise. Overconfidence Trade Up is an indicator that switches on if OC Trade Up is zero 
in year t-1 and is unity in year t. CEO Overconfidence Down is defined symmetrically to CEO 
Overconfidence Up. Variables definitions are in Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 2. (Continued) 
Panel A. Baseline Specifications of Supplier Commitment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
LOGIT: 
Suppliers 
Increase 
LOGIT: 
Suppliers  
Increase 
C-LOGIT: 
Suppliers  
Increase 
C-LOGIT: 
Suppliers 
Increase 
Holder 67 t-1 0.261*** 0.165**
(0.085) (0.080)
CEO Overconfidence Up t-1, t 0.517*** 0.367***
(0.113) (0.121)
CEO Stock Ownership t-1, t -0.006 -0.008 0.004
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Log (Total Assets t-1)  0.799*** 0.811*** -0.107
(0.034) (0.042) (0.066)
Leverage t-1 -0.389* -0.397* 0.050
(0.209) (0.231) (0.304)
Market-to-Book Ratio t-1 0.042*** 0.041** 0.014
(0.014) (0.016) (0.009)
Return on Assets t-1 0.251 0.445 0.683
(0.433) (0.386) (0.621)
Sales Growth t-2, t-1 0.314** 0.403*** 0.388**
(0.148) (0.140) (0.188)
Capital Expenditure t-1 1.164* 1.009 1.806**
(0.658) (0.951) (0.731)
R&D t-1 5.052*** 4.908*** 3.948***
(0.747) (0.627) (0.808)
Missing R&D t-1 0.229 0.202 0.354
(0.152) (0.145) (0.609)
Log (1 + CEO Tenure t-1) -0.025 0.017 0.001
(0.109) (0.107) (0.107)
Cash t-1 0.257 0.264 -0.693
(0.329) (0.339) (0.443)
ROA Volatility t-3, t-1 0.914 0.915* 0.401
(0.676) (0.501) (0.603)
Log (2-Year Stock Returns t-2, t-1) -0.025 -0.014 0.028
(0.075) (0.101) (0.100)
Acquisitions t-1, t 0.013 0.006 -0.055
(0.078) (0.083) (0.087)
Num. Suppliers t-1 -0.015** -0.016** -0.126***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.031)
Industry dummies Yes Yes No No
Year dummies Yes Yes No No
Observations 14,745 14,745 11,040 5,285
Pseudo R-squared 0.071 0.206 0.188 0.034
Industry-year strata No No Yes No
Firm strata No No No Yes
Firm cluster Yes Yes No No
Industry cluster No No Yes Yes
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Table 2. (Continued) 
Panel B. Alternative Specifications of Supplier Commitment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
C-LOGIT: 
Suppliers 
Increase 
C-LOGIT: 
Suppliers 
Increase# 
C-LOGIT: 
Suppliers 
Decrease 
C-LOGIT: 
Suppliers 
Decrease 
CEO Overconfidence t-1 0.908***
(0.199)
Overconfidence Trade Up t-1, t 0.199**
(0.099)
CEO Overconfidence Up t-1, t 0.155 0.092
(0.129) (0.127)
CEO Overconfidence Down t-1, t 0.401** 0.303**
(0.169) (0.144)
CEO Stock Ownership t-1, t -0.002 0.007 -0.026*** -0.014
(0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.018)
Log (Total Assets t-1)  -0.111* -0.154** 0.705*** 0.273***
(0.066) (0.067) (0.108) (0.092)
Leverage t-1 0.204 0.131 -0.232 0.424
(0.249) (0.289) (0.211) (0.395)
Market-to-Book Ratio t-1 -0.007 0.017 0.025** -0.000
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.021)
Return on Assets t-1 0.497 0.718* -0.660 -1.113**
(0.461) (0.418) (0.408) (0.491)
Sales Growth t-2, t-1 0.358** 0.435** -0.682*** -0.412*
(0.156) (0.180) (0.134) (0.229)
Capital Expenditure t-1 1.102 1.241** 1.478* 0.199
(0.722) (0.618) (0.836) (1.038)
R&D t-1 3.203*** 2.655*** 5.044*** 0.564
(0.751) (0.775) (0.666) (1.601)
Missing R&D t-1 0.188 0.344 0.146 -0.056
(0.594) (0.624) (0.176) (0.367)
Log (1 + CEO Tenure t-1) -0.063 0.003 0.151 0.081
(0.087) (0.086) (0.126) (0.158)
Cash t-1 -0.497 -0.569 -0.062 -0.171
(0.397) (0.353) (0.370) (0.640)
ROA Volatility t-3, t-1 0.402 0.012 -0.340 -1.942***
(0.583) (0.498) (0.788) (0.452)
Log (2-Year Stock Returns t-2, t-1) -0.133 -0.063 -0.103 0.092
(0.097) (0.082) (0.092) (0.101)
Acquisitions t-1, t -0.091 -0.074 0.052 -0.095
(0.080) (0.088) (0.077) (0.061)
Num. Suppliers t-1 -0.131*** -0.127*** 0.055 0.548***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.068) (0.174)
Observations 5,575 5,629 11,684 5,583
Pseudo R-squared 0.035 0.029 0.213 0.130
Firm strata Yes Yes No Yes
Industry-year strata No No Yes No
Industry cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
#Sample begins from year 1996 (inclusive) onwards because the sample is substantially smaller prior to 1996. 
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Table 3. 
The Effect of CEO Overconfidence on the Start/End of Supplier Network 
This table presents results from logit and conditional logit regressions. The dependent variable is 
Start of Supplier Network. Start of Supplier Network is a dummy variable that equates to unity 
when the firm has at least one dependent supplier in year t and none in t-1, and equates to zero 
otherwise. Dependent suppliers are defined according to SFAS 14. The key independent variables 
are CEO Overconfidence Up and Holder 67. CEO Overconfidence is per-option value of CEO’s 
vested and unexercised options scaled by average strike price (Campbell et al., 2011; Malmendier, 
Tate, and Yan, 2011; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012). CEO Overconfidence Up is a dummy 
variable that equates to unity if the continuous CEO Overconfidence in year t is in the top quartile 
of the sample and CEO Overconfidence in t-1 is not in the top quartile of the sample, and equates 
to zero otherwise. Holder 67 is a dummy variable which equates to unity if the CEO’s vested 
option holdings are at least 67% in-the-money on at least 2 instances (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; 
Malmendier et al., 2011), and equates to zero otherwise. Holder 67 switches from zero to unity 
from the first such instance. Columns (1) and (2) present results from a logit model while Columns 
(3) and (4) present results from a conditional logit model. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 3. (Continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
 
LOGIT: 
Start Supp. 
Network 
LOGIT: 
Start Supp. 
Network 
C-LOGIT: 
Start Supp. 
Network 
C-LOGIT: 
Start Supp. 
Network 
Holder 67 t-1 0.241** 0.178*
(0.096) (0.106)
CEO Overconfidence Up t-1, t 0.436*** 0.305**
(0.128) (0.149)
CEO Stock Ownership t-1, t -0.018 -0.017 0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Log (Total Assets t-1)  0.318*** 0.328*** -0.235***
(0.036) (0.046) (0.085)
Leverage t-1 0.075 0.143 0.163
(0.255) (0.319) (0.333)
Market-to-Book Ratio t-1 0.024 0.015 0.027*
(0.018) (0.020) (0.016)
Return on Assets t-1 0.109 0.532 0.367
(0.522) (0.423) (0.629)
Sales Growth t-2, t-1 0.428** 0.494** 0.550**
(0.173) (0.206) (0.254)
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.362 -0.327 -0.799
(0.797) (1.666) (1.267)
R&D t-1 3.224*** 3.182*** 2.449***
(0.908) (0.589) (0.872)
Missing R&D t-1 -0.037 -0.059 0.565
(0.169) (0.176) (0.517)
Log (1 + CEO Tenure t-1) 0.007 0.097 0.145
(0.136) (0.172) (0.160)
Cash t-1 -0.187 -0.257 -0.503
(0.387) (0.344) (0.663)
ROA Volatility t-3, t-1 0.366 0.534 -1.036
(0.855) (0.565) (0.828)
Log (2-Year Stock Returns t-2, t-1) -0.018 -0.038 -0.027
(0.090) (0.110) (0.083)
Acquisitions t-1, t -0.014 -0.006 -0.123
(0.100) (0.096) (0.104)
Industry dummies Yes Yes No No 
Year dummies Yes Yes No No 
Observations 14,731 14,731 9,054 4,040
Pseudo R-squared 0.027 0.056 0.045 0.017
Industry-year strata No No Yes No 
Firm strata No No No Yes 
Firm cluster Yes Yes No No 
Industry cluster No No Yes Yes 
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Table 4.  
The Effect of CEO Overconfidence on Suppliers in  
Industries with High Relationship-Specific Investment 
This table presents results from conditional logit regressions. The dependent variables are 
Suppliers Increase and Start of Supplier Network. Suppliers Increase is a dummy variable that 
equates to unity if a firm has more dependent suppliers in year t than it has in t-1, and equates 
to zero otherwise. Start of Supplier Network is a dummy variable that equates to unity when the 
firm has at least one dependent supplier in year t and none in t-1, and equates to zero otherwise. 
The key independent variable in Panel A and Panel C is Holder 67. Holder 67 is a dummy variable 
that equates to unity if the CEO’s vested option holdings are at least 67% in-the-money on at 
least 2 instances (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier et al., 2011), and equates to zero 
otherwise. Holder 67 switches from zero to unity from the first such instance. The key independent 
variable in Panel B and Panel D is CEO Overconfidence Up. CEO Overconfidence is per-option 
value of CEO’s vested and unexercised options scaled by average strike price (Campbell et al., 
2011; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011; Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh, 2012). CEO Overconfidence 
Up indicator is a dummy variable that equates to unity if the continuous CEO Overconfidence 
measure in year t is in the top quartile of the sample and CEO Overconfidence in t-1 is not in the 
top quartile of the sample, and equates to zero otherwise. In Panel A and Panel B, we split the 
manufacturing firms into (i) durable (SIC 3400-3999), and (ii) non-durable (SIC 2000-3399) 
manufacturing industry types following Titman and Wessels (1988). In Panel C and Panel D, we 
split the manufacturing firms by industry-level relationship-specificity according to the year 1997 
contract intensity variable from Nunn (2007). An industry is classified as High (Low) RSI if its 
industry contract intensity is above (below) the sample median. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 4. (Continued) 
Panel A. Durable/Non-Durable Manufacturing Industries Subsample Analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
LOGIT:
Suppliers 
Increase 
LOGIT:
Suppliers 
Increase 
LOGIT:
Start Supp. 
Network 
LOGIT:
Start Supp. 
Network 
Industry Type Durable Non-Durable Durable Non-Durable 
Holder 67 t-1 0.225* -0.011 0.308* -0.055
(0.136) (0.171) (0.187) (0.224)
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,946 4,037 4,946 4,037
Pseudo R-squared 0.219 0.241 0.069 0.073
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B. Durable/Non-Durable Manufacturing Industries Subsample Analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
C-LOGIT:
Suppliers 
Increase 
C-LOGIT:
Suppliers 
Increase 
C-LOGIT:
Start Supp. 
Network 
C-LOGIT:
Start Supp. 
Network 
Industry Type Durable Non-Durable Durable Non-Durable 
CEO Overconfidence Up t-1, t 0.559*** 0.249 0.564*** -0.207
(0.210) (0.271) (0.149) (0.249)
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,771 1,411 1,372 1,032
Pseudo R-squared 0.042 0.070 0.026 0.028
Firm strata Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4. (Continued) 
Panel C. High/Low RSI Manufacturing Industries Subsample Analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
LOGIT:
Suppliers 
Increase 
LOGIT:
Suppliers 
Increase 
LOGIT:
Start Supp. 
Network 
LOGIT:
Start Supp. 
Network 
Relationship Specificity High Low High Low 
Holder 67 t-1 0.299* 0.060 0.458** 0.046
(0.164) (0.176) (0.219) (0.233)
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,472 4,057 4,472 4,057
Pseudo R-squared 0.210 0.251 0.083 0.070
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel D. High/Low RSI Manufacturing Industries Subsample Analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
C-LOGIT:
Suppliers 
Increase 
C-LOGIT:
Suppliers 
Increase 
C-LOGIT:
Start Supp. 
Network 
C-LOGIT:
Start Supp. 
Network 
Relationship Specificity High Low High Low 
CEO Overconfidence Up t-1, t 0.340** 0.382 0.464*** 0.040
(0.140) (0.358) (0.096) (0.334)
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,583 1,221 1,231 939
Pseudo R-squared 0.045 0.073 0.027 0.028
Firm strata Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5. 
The Effect of CEO Overconfidence on Relationship Specific Investment 
This table presents results from OLS regressions. The unit of observation in this table is a 
customer-supplier pair in a year. The dependent variable in Panel A is Supplier R&D Intensity. 
For each observation, we compute the value of R&D activity of the supplier that is attributable 
to the customer by multiplying the R&D expenses of the supplier by Supplier Sales Dependency. 
Supplier Sales Dependency is defined as the ratio of supplier-to-customer pair sales to total supplier 
sales. Subsequently, we compute Supplier R&D Intensity by normalizing the above by total assets 
of the supplier since larger suppliers may have a greater capacity to commit more resources 
towards R&D activities. Finally, values of Supplier R&D Intensity are inflated by a factor of 1000. 
We apply the logarithmic transformation to Supplier R&D Intensity in the regressions. The key 
independent variable in this table is Holder 67. Holder 67 is a dummy variable that equates to 
unity if the CEO’s vested option holdings are at least 67% in-the-money on at least 2 instances 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier et al., 2011), and equates to zero otherwise. Holder 67 
switches from zero to unity from the first such instance. In Columns (3) and (4), we split the 
sample by the Supplier-Customer Size Ratio. For each customer-supplier pair in a year, Supplier-
Customer Size Ratio is computed as the ratio of total assets of the supplier to that of the customer. 
Therefore, smaller values of Supplier-Customer Size Ratio imply that the supplier is smaller than 
the customer. Supplier-Customer Size Ratio is defined to be small (big) if it is lower (higher) than 
the SIC 2-digit industry median value. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. Where multiple fixed effects are deployed, singleton 
observations are eliminated from the sample. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 5. (Continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
 OLS:
Supp. R&D 
Intensity 
OLS:
Supp. R&D 
Intensity  
OLS: 
Supp. R&D 
Intensity  
OLS:
Supp. R&D 
Intensity  
Supplier-Customer Size Ratio  All All Small Big 
Holder 67 t-1 0.110*** 0.071* 0.148*** -0.014
(0.042) (0.039) (0.046) (0.048)
Customer Control Variables 
Stock Ownership t-1 0.110*** 0.071* 0.148*** -0.014
(0.042) (0.039) (0.046) (0.048)
Log (Market Cap t-1) 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.035*** 0.017**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008)
Leverage t-1 0.007 0.055*** 0.059** -0.021
(0.020) (0.018) (0.026) (0.025)
M/B Ratio t-1 -0.547*** -0.419*** -0.460*** -0.575***
(0.135) (0.125) (0.160) (0.168)
Return on Assets t-1 0.007 -0.000 -0.004 0.014
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Sales Growth t-2, t-1 0.254 0.283 0.542 0.314
(0.360) (0.338) (0.429) (0.419)
Capital Expenditure t-1 0.263** 0.254** 0.133 0.299**
(0.115) (0.106) (0.140) (0.120)
R&D t-1 -1.494*** -1.279*** -1.453** -0.209
(0.519) (0.481) (0.647) (0.583)
Missing R&D t-1 4.903*** 4.057*** 3.672*** 4.055***
(0.585) (0.519) (0.761) (0.627)
Log (1 + CEO Tenure t-1) -0.126 -0.099 -0.070 -0.128
(0.097) (0.089) (0.117) (0.105)
Cash t-1 -0.071 -0.065 -0.038 -0.071
(0.055) (0.049) (0.060) (0.060)
ROA Volatility t-3, t-1  0.815*** 0.750*** 0.583* 0.798***
(0.249) (0.241) (0.324) (0.291)
Cust. Num. Suppliers t-1 -0.273 -0.274 -1.223 0.525
(0.599) (0.558) (0.811) (0.673)
Log (2-Year Stock Returns t-2, t-1) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquisitions t-1 -0.060 -0.010 -0.054 0.013
(0.042) (0.040) (0.046) (0.054)
Supplier Control Variables 
Leverage t-1 -0.935*** -0.590*** -1.013***
(0.065) (0.086) (0.094)
M/B Ratio t-1 0.026*** 0.014*** 0.029***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Return on Assets t-1 -0.928*** -0.894*** -1.106***
(0.065) (0.072) (0.128)
 
 
51 
Table 5. (Continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sales Growth t-2, t-1 0.068*** 0.075** 0.024
(0.024) (0.030) (0.041)
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.001*** -0.009*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Cash t-1 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
ROA Volatility t-3, t-1 0.771*** 0.702*** 0.783***
(0.080) (0.090) (0.155)
Log (Market Cap t-1) -0.072*** 0.004 0.005
(0.009) (0.017) (0.018)
Observations 12,002 12,002 6,159 5,836
R-squared 0.277 0.364 0.338 0.402
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Customer-year cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6. 
The Effect of CEO Overconfidence on Durations of Customer-Supplier Relationships 
This table presents results from Andersen-Gill Cox regressions (Andersen and Gill, 1982). The Andersen-Gill extension of the Cox 
model is designed to study multiple ordered events. In our dataset, a given customer-supplier relationship may end at a particular time 
point and restart in the future. Therefore, the start of a customer-supplier relationship is either the first time the relationship is 
documented in the Compustat business segment file or the earliest year in which the previously-terminated relationship is restarted. 
For analysis in STATA, a customer-supplier pair with one previous termination and one restart is represented as 2 relationships 
(observations) in the dataset. Following Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006), if a relationship ends because the supplier/customer becomes 
inactive in Compustat or if the relationship lasts up till the final year of the sample period (2012), we treat the length of relationship 
as being right-censored. The key independent variables are Holder 67 Relationship, Beginning Supplier R&D Intensity, and Beginning 
Sales Dependency, and Beginning Size Ratio. A relationship is classified as a Holder 67 Relationship if a Holder 67 customer CEO is 
incumbent between the start (inclusive) and end (exclusive) of the relationship. Since a Holder 67 Relationship may take at least 2 
years to be established, we only include relationships that begin on or after 1995. Beginning Supplier R&D Intensity, Beginning Sales 
Dependency and Beginning Size Ratio are the values of Supplier R&D Intensity, Sale Dependency, and Supplier-Customer Size Ratio 
in the first year of the relationship respectively. Readers may refer to Appendix I or previous tables for definitions of Holder 67, Supplier 
R&D Intensity, Sales Dependency, and Supplier-Customer Size Ratio. In Columns (2) to (5), we also include all supplier and customer 
control variables used in Table 5. These control variables matched to the first year of the relationship. To verify that the assumption 
of hazard proportionality between Holder 67 Relationships and non-Holder 67 Relationships is satisfied, we include interactions of 
covariates with time in Columns (4) and (5). We allow customer-supplier relationships to end and restart in Columns (1) to (4). In 
Column (5), we restrict the sample to customer-supplier relationships with no restarts. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1. Clustered 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimated coefficients of supplier and customer control variables are not presented in the 
table to facilitate presentation. These control variables are customer CEO stock ownership, customer CEO tenure, market capitalization, 
leverage, market-to-book ratio, ROA, sales growth, capital expenditure, R&D expenditure, cash, ROA volatility, number of suppliers, 
2-year stock returns, and M&A activities. Estimated coefficients are presented as hazard ratios. ***, **, * represent statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 6. (Continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Andersen-Gill
Cox Model 
Andersen-Gill
Cox Model 
Andersen-Gill
Cox Model 
Andersen-Gill
Cox Model 
Andersen-Gill
Cox Model 
Relationship Restarts Allowed Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Main Covariates 
Holder 67 Relationship s, i 0.892*** 0.825*** 0.803*** 0.708*** 0.660***
(0.036) (0.042) (0.044) (0.089) (0.098)
Beginning Size Ratio s, i 1.067 1.317 1.529**
(0.084) (0.239) (0.325)
Beginning Supp. R&D Intensity s, i 1.019 1.031 1.042
(0.022) (0.049) (0.060)
Beginning Sales Dependency s, i 0.781*** 0.743*** 0.675***
(0.030) (0.067) (0.073)
Supp. & Cust. Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interactions with Time 
Holder 67 Relationship s, i  1.010 1.012
 (0.013) (0.015)
Beginning Supp. R&D Intensity s, i  0.999 0.998
 -0.005 (0.006)
Beginning Sales Dependency s, i  1.006 1.010
 (0.009) (0.011)
Beginning Size Ratio s, i  0.982 0.967
 (0.018) (0.021)
Supp. & Cust. Controls  Yes Yes
Observations 4,974 3,579 3,060 3,060 2,208
Unique customer-supplier pairs 4,427 3,181 2,736 2,736 2,208
Customer-supplier pair-years 14,502 10,604 8,958 8,958 6,185
Log likelihood -19,341 -13,445 -11,167 -11,142 -7,029
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Table 7. 
Do Overconfident CEOs Overpay Suppliers? 
This table presents results from OLS regressions. The dependent variables are Input Costs and 
Markup Percentage. Input Costs is the ratio of the difference between total sales and cost of goods 
sold (COGS) to total sales. Markup Percentage is the ratio of the difference between total sales 
and COGS to COGS. The key independent variable is Holder 67. Holder 67 is a dummy variable 
which equates to unity if the CEO’s vested option holdings are at least 67% in-the-money on at 
least 2 instances (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier et al., 2011), and equates to zero 
otherwise. Holder 67 switches from zero to unity from the first such instance. We restrict the 
sample to only include firms with at least 1 supplier in the current year and at least 1 supplier in 
the preceding year. Variable definitions are in Appendix 1. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 7. (Continued) 
  (1) (2) 
 OLS: 
Input Costs 
OLS:  
Markup Percentage 
Holder 67 t-1 -0.014* 0.164*** 
(0.008) (0.049) 
CEO Stock Ownership t-1, t 0.001 -0.004 
(0.001) (0.004) 
Log (Total Assets t-1)  0.004 0.007 
(0.003) (0.023) 
Leverage t-1 -0.003 -0.109 
(0.024) (0.153) 
Market-to-Book Ratio t-1 -0.008*** 0.043*** 
(0.001) (0.011) 
Return on Assets t-1 -0.504*** 2.790*** 
(0.056) (0.507) 
Sales Growth t-2, t-1 0.093*** -0.143 
(0.020) (0.135) 
Capital Expenditure t-1 -0.050 -0.291 
(0.105) (0.759) 
R&D t-1 -1.519*** 9.640*** 
(0.094) (1.176) 
Missing R&D t-1 -0.006 0.008 
(0.022) (0.146) 
Log (1 + CEO Tenure t-1) -0.008 0.014 
(0.009) (0.067) 
Cash t-1 0.145*** -0.980** 
(0.053) (0.465) 
ROA Volatility t-3, t-1 -0.173** 1.778*** 
(0.075) (0.639) 
Num. Suppliers t-1 0.001*** -0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.002) 
Log (2-Year Stock Returns t-2, t-1) 0.030*** -0.216*** 
(0.008) (0.069) 
Acquisitions t-1, t -0.013* 0.097 
(0.008) (0.075) 
Observations 2,244 2,244 
R-squared 0.653 0.534 
Industry-year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry-year cluster Yes Yes 
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Table 8. 
Does the Manner of Leadership Matter? 
This table presents results from logit regressions. The dependent variable is Suppliers Increase. 
Supplier Increase is a dummy variable that equates to unity if a firm has more dependent suppliers 
in year t than it has in t-1, and equates to zero otherwise. Dependent suppliers are defined 
according to SFAS 14. The key independent variables are CEO Media Positivity and Holder 67. 
CEO Media Positivity is a dummy variable that equates to unity if the number of articles 
containing references to confidence is more than the number of articles containing references to 
non-confidence during the year, and equates to zero otherwise (Banerjee, Humphrey-Jenner, and 
Nanda, 2015). Missing values of CEO Media Positivity are set to zero. Holder 67 is a dummy 
variable which equates to unity if the CEO’s vested option holdings are at least 67% in-the-money 
on at least 2 instances (Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier et al., 2011), and equates to zero 
otherwise. Holder 67 switches from zero to unity from the first such instance. We use firms of all 
industry types in Columns (1) and (2). In Columns (3) and (4), we split the manufacturing firms 
into (i) durable (SIC 3400-3999), and (ii) non-durable (SIC 2000-3399) manufacturing industry 
types following Titman and Wessels (1988). Variables are described in Appendix 1. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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  Table 8. (Continued) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)
 LOGIT: 
Suppliers 
Increase 
LOGIT: 
Suppliers 
Increase 
LOGIT:  
Suppliers 
Increase 
LOGIT: 
Suppliers 
Increase 
Industry Type All All Durable Non-Durable 
CEO Media Positivity t-1 0.038 0.032 0.004 -0.122
(0.152) (0.152) (0.257) (0.336)
Holder 67 t-1 0.228** 0.323* 0.006
(0.109) (0.195) (0.229)
CEO Stock Ownership t-1, t -0.019 -0.021 0.027 -0.032
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.036)
Log (Total Assets t-1)  0.801*** 0.804*** 1.078*** 1.032***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.095) (0.107)
Leverage t-1 -0.478 -0.452 -1.002** -0.430
(0.294) (0.293) (0.399) (0.710)
Market-to-Book Ratio t-1 0.043** 0.038** 0.002 -0.021
(0.019) (0.019) (0.035) (0.036)
Return on Assets t-1 0.073 0.038 -0.131 2.606*
(0.616) (0.617) (0.927) (1.394)
Sales Growth t-2, t-1 0.444** 0.420* -0.035 0.473
(0.224) (0.225) (0.442) (0.392)
Capital Expenditure t-1 0.477 0.335 -2.061 -3.458
(1.052) (1.056) (2.226) (3.294)
R&D t-1 5.077*** 4.938*** 6.282*** 10.993***
(1.161) (1.169) (1.855) (2.437)
Missing R&D t-1 0.318 0.300 0.955** 0.002
(0.203) (0.202) (0.382) (0.272)
Log (1 + CEO Tenure t-1) 0.137 0.067 0.118 -0.022
(0.156) (0.156) (0.263) (0.276)
Cash t-1 0.295 0.296 1.095 -1.039
(0.478) (0.475) (0.795) (0.908)
ROA Volatility t-3, t-1 0.658 0.665 -0.534 1.016
(0.889) (0.891) (1.551) (1.482)
Log (2-Year Stock Returns t-2, t-
1) 
-0.054 -0.066 -0.058 0.529**
(0.104) (0.104) (0.196) (0.245)
Acquisitions t-1, t -0.034 -0.043 -0.106 -0.181
(0.106) (0.106) (0.204) (0.194)
Num. Suppliers t-1 -0.011** -0.010* -0.060*** -0.209***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.020) (0.077)
Observations 7,923 7,923 2,799 1,959
Pseudo R-squared 0.213 0.214 0.240 0.291
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
